Archive for November, 2013

Apakah Cina Mulai Kehabisan Tenaga?

November 26th, 2013 No comments

“The speed and depth of the Chinese policy response will help determine the severity and duration of this crisis. If the Chinese address the issue quickly and move decisively to rein in credit expansion and accept a period of much lower growth, they may be able to use the government and People’s Bank of China’s balance sheet to cushion the adjustment in the economy. If, however, they continue on the current path and allow this deterioration to reach its natural and logical limit, we will likely see a full-scale recession as well as a collapse in asset and real estate prices sometime next year. China’s direct contribution to global growth is enormous, but perhaps equally as important is its role in generating growth in developed and emerging economies. A slowdown, whether significant or extreme, in the Chinese economy heralds very bad news for asset prices around the world. A growth crisis centered in Asia will further exacerbate the instability and volatility in Japan and have a devastating impact on second derivative marketplaces such as Australia, Brazil and developing markets in South East Asia.”

            — Hayman Capital’s Kyle Bass

Model pertumbuhan ekonomi Cina terlihat timpang – telah menyia-nyiakan sumber daya pada skala belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya. Kota-kotanya kosong, kapasitas industri berlebihan dan kredit konstruksi yang jatuh tempo terus mengotori perekonomian negara.

New lending yield terus merosot di bawah pertumbuhan yang meningkat. Dan yang terburuk adalah proyek-proyek konstruksi tidak menghasilkan cukup uang menutup hutang-hutangnya.

Perekonomian Cina, seperti kebanyakan yang lain, bertumpu pada fondasi kredit yang goyah. Negara ini telah membuat sesuatu yang akan memberikan ledakan terbesarnya dalam sejarah – ledakan yang akan dipicu oleh pertumbuhan yang tidak berkelanjutan dalam pasokan uang dan kredit.

Bahkan, hutang pasar negara berkembang diasumsikan akan menyerupai krisis subprime mortgage tahun 2007 silam, dengan pusat episentrum di Cina.

Berikut adalah penjelasan singkatnya dalam sebuah headline di London Telegraph:

Fitch Says China Credit Bubble Unprecedented in Modern World History

“The credit-driven growth model is clearly falling apart,” says the agency’s senior director in Beijing. In early June, China’s interbank-lending rates came unhinged.

On June 8, for instance, the overnight repo rate jumped more than 100% to 9.78%. Another key interbank rate set by the National Interbank Funding Center has jumped 336% since May.

By June 21, the country’s leading commercial bank, the Bank of China, was denying that it had defaulted. This should be the first of many such denials, which will then be followed by full-blown defaults.

Here’s another headline hinting at the depth and breadth of the unfolding crisis: “Bond Auctions Fail from Russia to Korea.”

Artikel itu mencatat bahwa lonjakan yield global membuat perusahaan dimanapun akan melakukan “delay funding efforts.” Dengan kata lain, krisis belum berakhir.

Selama enam bulan terakhir Cina telah menyuntikkan dana lebih dari $1,6 triliun untuk kredit baru (21% dari PDB) di dalam perekonomiannya. Jika memang terjadi krisis kredit di sana, meskipun  masih menambah sedemikian besar kredit ke perekonomian, maka masalahnya tentu akan besar.

Hanya untuk memastikan bahwa Anda sungguh memahami krisis kredit yang berkembang di Cina, saya memiliki tiga laporan menarik Tyler Durden dari yang masuk dalam kategori HARUS DIBACA:

1)   China To Kick Bad Debt Hornets Nest (July 28th)

The last (and first) time China’s National Audit Office conducted an audit of local government debt two years ago, in June 2011, it found that local governments and their various financing vehicles had taken on 10.7 trillion yuan of debt as at the end of 2010, which brought the issue of “underreported” high leverage in China to the fore. In the then words of Liu Jiayi, the country’s auditor-general, “some local government financing platforms’ management is irregular, and their profitability and ability to pay their debt is quite weak.

Others quickly chimed in: UBS estimated that local government debt could be 30 percent of gross domestic product and may generate around 2 to 3 trillion yuan of non-performing loans. Credit Suisse economist Tao Dong said it was the biggest “time bomb” for China’s economy. This was the most explicit warning about a credit bubble in China both internally and from “credible” outsiders (not fringe blogs and “conflicted” short-sellers) that had be uttered to date. It certainly wouldn’t be the last as the recent aggressive attempts at deleveraging and reform in the financial system have shown.

Overnight, nearly two years after the first such audit, China announced it is conducting a follow up nationwide inquiry into government borrowings, “as the nation’s growth slowdown puts pressure on the new leadership to determine the extent of potential bad debts weighing down the economy.”

So why now? Bloomberg has some suggestions:

The State Council, under Premier Li Keqiang, requested the National Audit Office to conduct a review, according to today’s statement from the audit office’s website, without providing any more details. The first audit of local government debt found liabilities of 10.7 trillion yuan ($1.8 trillion) at the end of 2010, the National Audit Office said in June 2011. 

Local-government financing vehicles need to repay a record amount of debt this year, prompting Moody’s Investors Service to warn Premier Li may set an example by allowing China’s first onshore bond default. Local governments set up more than 10,000 LGFVs to fund the construction of roads, sewage plants and subways after they were barred from directly issuing bonds under a 1994 budget law. A 4-trillion-yuan stimulus plan during the 2008-09 financial crisis swelled loans to companies, which they have been rolling over or refinancing with new note sales.

LGFVs may hold more than 20 trillion yuan of debt, former Finance Minister Xiang Huaicheng said in April. That’s almost double the figure given by the National Audit Office in 2011. Refinancing will be a challenge after corporate bond sales slumped to a two-year low in the second quarter and policy makers cracked down on shadow banking activities that bypass regulatory limits on lending.

In other words, China is preparing to admit that the level of problem Local Government Financing Vehicle debt is double what was first reported just two years ago, something many suspected but few dared to voice in the open. But not only that: since the likely level of Non-Performing Loans (i.e., bad debt) within the LGFV universe has long been suspected to be in 30% range, a doubling of the official figure will also mean a doubling of the bad debt notional up to a stunning and nose bleeding-inducing $1 trillion, or roughly 15% of China’s goal-seeked GDP! We wish the local banks the best of luck as they scramble to find the hundreds of billions in capital to fill what is about to emerge as the biggest non-Lehman solvency hole in financial history (without the benefit of a Federal Reserve bailout that is).

Of course, now that China has set off on a reform path of active deleveraging, the “disclosures” about the true state of the world’s biggest housing bubble (one that makes even Bernanke green with envy) are about to start coming fast and furious. And since LGFV debt is just one small part of the Chinese debt bubble and accounts for a tiny fraction of total consolidated Debt/GDP (recall that just Chinese corporate debt is the largest relative to the nation’s GDP anywhere in the world), another theme we have covered extensively in the past, most recently here, one can only wonder what other “discoveries” lie in store.


Nico-39For a few suggestions of what else may be uncovered soon, here are some excerpts from Morgan Stanley’s recent report “China Deleveraging: A Bumpy Ride Ahead”:

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, monetary rather than fiscal policy likely played a bigger role in boosting domestic demand in China. This can be seen by the rise in bank credit to GDP. China’s total outstanding bank credit picked up from 102% of GDP in December 2008 to 133% of GDP in June 2013, thereby boosting domestic demand. Indeed, total outstanding bank credit has increased by US$7.2 trillion over December 2008 to June 2013 (Exhibit 9). Also, the non-loan sources of credit such as wealth management products, trust loans and bonds (total social financing) increased by US$3 trillion over the same period. Though policy makers’ stimulus was targeted at both investment and discretionary consumption by households, a large part of this funding was channeled into investment, with 70% of the loans going towards the corporate sector over this period.


China’s incremental GDP return from leverage has been declining…


Credit-Driven Growth Has Reached Its Limits

Signs abound that the strategy of pursuing growth via credit has reached its limits. Indeed, policy makers are getting concerned about financial stability risks and the misallocation of capital. Some of the key indicators, raising questions about the sustainability of the current trend, are as follows:

               #1: Weakening productivity of incremental credit

The asset quality issue in the banking system is the other side of the coin to the loss in capital productivity that we described earlier. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, there was only a brief period of four quarters in 2011 when nominal GDP growth outpaced credit growth. However, in the past six quarters, loan growth has again been outpacing nominal GDP growth. As of June 2013, nominal GDP growth was 8.0% compared with credit growth of 15.1% YoY (Exhibit 16).


This is a reflection of the weakening productivity of incremental credit in our view. If one instead uses social financing (the broadest possible measure of credit) as the gauge, the divergence with nominal growth is even more concerning. In light of current trends, we believe any attempt to push the overall investment growth engine further will only increase the risk of a deeper and prolonged shock later on as it exacerbates the problem of excess capacity, and the continued buildup of leverage and weak profitability growth weighs further on corporate  balance sheets.

               #2 Interest rates higher than nominal output growth of secondary sector

The nominal benchmark 1-year lending rate at 6% and producer price inflation at -2.7% imply a real borrowing cost of 8.7% for the corporate sector. However, the true cost of borrowing for the corporate sector is likely higher, given that the weighted average lending rate in the banking system was 6.7% in March 2013 and non-banking borrowing would come at an even higher cost. In comparison, real growth in secondary sector output stands at 7.6%YoY in June 2013 (Exhibit 17).


While CPI is typically used to compute real rates, we have used PPI in China because the bulk of the leverage buildup has been predominantly due to corporates and not households. In any case, the conclusion remains unchanged even if we were to compare nominal interest rates with nominal output growth of the secondary sector (Exhibit 18).


The latter now is 5.1%, lower than nominal corporate borrowing costs. A higher interest rate relative to the underlying income growth means that debt is compounding at a much faster pace than underlying income growth and the debt trajectory ultimately becomes unsustainable. This challenge has emerged because nominal GDP growth has decelerated significantly in the last few quarters. On the other hand, policy makers have been hesitant to cut rates owing to concerns about sending the wrong signals to entities that have overinvested. The current real  interest rate environment will likely exacerbate the asset quality issues in the banking system. Indeed, historical episodes of risk aversion in the financial system in both the US and Japan have also taken place when real rates exceeded real GDP growth.

And so we get to the point where one more country has reached the end of the can-kicking road, and is about to kick the only remaining thing it can instead: the hornets’ nest of a truly epic debt bubble.

2)   China’s “Childish” Bond Market Crosses Tipping Point (August 16th)

That China faces a number of serious economic (and potentially social) problems is no surprise and as Guggenheim’s Scott Minerd notes, trying to predict when persistent structural problems will lead to a shock for markets is extremely difficult (as we noted here). However, from a symbiotic collapse in the previously ‘virtuous’ bond-market-to-banking-system relationship, to the drying up of easy credit for all but the largest (and least over-capacity) firms, it appears that China’s private sector leverage has crossed the tipping point that signalled crises in the US, UK, Japan and South Korea. Although the recent data (believe it or not) show signs of stabilization in the Chinese economy, the elevated debt burden should continue to cast doubt over its growth sustainability and the “childish” and non-transparent nature of China’s bond market offers little or no hope for a free market solution.

On China’s “childish” bond market (as we noted here),

(via WSJ),

Worried about a boom in lending by the country’s fast-growing “shadow banks,” China created a cash crunch in June to squeeze their source of funding.

One unintended consequence, though, was a selloff in the country’s $4 trillion bond market.


The selloff – triggered by banks selling bonds to raise cash – bolstered critics of China’s financial system, who point to its bond market as an under recognized risk to the country as it struggles to control surging lending amid a weakening.


               The market trails only the U.S., Japan and France in size,


“China’s bond market is like a child compared to that in other countries,” said Jing Wang, deputy general manager of fixed income at Goldstate Securities Co. which has pared back its holdings of Chinese bonds following the selloff, because it has concerns about near-term volatility and “the lack of transparency in the market” in the long run, he said.


“The goal of developing the bond market is to reduce the dependence on banks for funding, but at the end of the day the risk is back to banks again,”

On China’s real-economy cash crunch and the rising potential for social unrest,

(via NYTimes),

a painful credit crisis is now spreading across Shenmu and cities nearby, as thousands of businesses have closed, fleets of BMWs and Audis have been repossessed and street protests have erupted.

Now the leading purveyors of Western fashions are deserted, monthly sales at restaurants are down as much as 97 percent and the marble entrance to the Fortune Garden Club is shuttered. All but one of the city’s car dealerships have failed.


“It’s an economic crisis just like the United States has had; just like it,” said Wang Ting, an operator of an illegal casino in Fugu, near Shenmu. “There’s no cash, everyone stays home without a job, there’s no way the economy can recover.”

                “Almost no one will give you a loan,” said a construction executive


                “It’s a national problem, it’s not a local issue,” he said.


 Public discontent is fueling street protests. Several thousand residents turned out in mid-July for a demonstration in the expensively paved square across the street from city hall, demanding that municipal officials revive the stalled economy.

China Approaching a Tipping Point?

(via Guggenheim’s Scott Minerd),

The massive build up of leverage in the Chinese financial system continues to represent one of the greatest risks to the world economy, with some estimates putting total Chinese debt at over 200 percent of GDP. China now represents 16 percent of global GDP, and contributed approximately 30 percent of the increase in global GDP in 2012. A crisis in its financial system could have damaging effects on global output and particularly on countries such as Singapore, South Korea, and Australia, which have large export exposure to China. The higher China’s debt levels climb, and the longer the country’s other structural economic issues — such as a consumption/investment imbalance, and an overheating property market — remain unresolved, the more severe the fallout will be should a credit crisis occur.

Trying to predict when persistent structural problems, such as those facing China, will lead to a shock for markets is extremely difficult. The evolution toward a breaking point can take months or years, and equally challenging is predicting how long the crisis could last. Pressure in the United States’ housing market reached its peak in 2006, for instance, but the most significant damage to markets did not occur until 2008. Despite the difficulty in putting a timeframe on a potential sequence of events, we can be certain that the margin of safety for global investments is thin and continues to recede.

For perspective, throughout my career, I have never been through a period of longer than five or so years without encountering a highly damaging financial incident. Mexico’s 1982 economic crisis, the stock market collapse of 1987, the credit crunch of 1989, the bond market collapse in 1994, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the bursting of the dot-com bubble from 2000 to 2002, and the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis which began unfolding in 2007 and bottomed in 2009 are like the tolling of a bell. As we move further into the second half of 2013 and 2014, it would not be a surprise to hear it toll again…and investors would do well to remember the 17th century words of John Donne, “…never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”


A rapid increase in private sector leverage in a relatively short period of time often presages major financial crises. Historical examples include the collapse of the Japanese property bubble in 1990, the financial crisis in South Korea in 1997, and the most recent crises in the United States, Britain, and the euro zone, which all happened after private sector debt surged to or above 170 percent of GDP. Chinese private sector leverage has reached this significant level. Over the past four years, non-financial private sector debt in China has more than doubled, primarily driven by massive corporate borrowing endorsed by government officials to maintain economic growth rates.

Although the recent data show signs of stabilization in the Chinese economy, the elevated debt burden should continue to cast doubt over its growth sustainability.

3) Big Trouble In Massive China: “The Nation Might Face Credit Losses Of As Much As $3 Trillion (November 19th)

The following chart from Bloomberg showing official Chinese NPL data has its pros and cons.


The pros: it shows that the trend in improving NPLs has dramatically inverted in the past ten quarters and has risen to the highest in at least three years.

The cons: the chart, which again is based on official data, is woefully misrepresenting and underestimating just how profound the bad debt situation is in a country in which each month pseudo-nationalized banks issue loans amounting to the same or more in new liquidity as the Fed and BOJ do combined!

That the Chinese reality “on the ground” is far worse than what is represented was known to Zero Hedge readers over a year ago. For those who may have forgotten, on November 5, 2012 we showed “The Chinese Credit Bubble – Full Frontal” and specifically this chart.


And of course  “The True Chinese Credit Bubble: 240% Of GDP And Soaring” from April:

What is even more concerning is that in order to maintain its breakneck economic “growth” of ~8% per year, China has to continue injecting massive amounts of debt, the so called “credit impulse” or “flow” which according to assorted views, is what is the true driver of an economy, and where GDP growth is merely a reflection of how much credit is entering (or leaving) the system.

The chart below shows that total Chinese social financing flow just hit a record for the month of March.


Completing the picture is the estimated economic response to a surge
in credit. As the last chart shows, in China the biggest benefit to a surge in flow is felt in the quarter immediately following the credit injection, as one would expect, with the effect tapering off and even going negative in future quarters, thus requiring even more debt creation to offset the adverse impacts of prior such injections.


What should become obvious is that in order to maintain its unprecedented (if declining) growth rate, China has to inject ever greater amounts of credit into its economy, amounts which will push its total credit pile ever higher into the stratosphere, until one day it pulls a Europe and finds itself in a situation where there are no further encumberable assets (for secured loans), and where ever-deteriorating cash flows are no longer sufficient to satisfy the interest payments on unsecured debt, leading to what the Chinese government has been desperate to avoid: mass corporate defaults.

But while China’s debt – an arcane mixture of public, private, and pseudo-government backstopped credit – is among the biggest in the world, the one outstanding question was how much longer can China keep sweeping the hundreds of billions if not trillions of discharged, bad loans under the carpet and pretend everything is fine.

Today we get some much needed perspective on this topic courtesy of Bloomberg, which has some very disturbing revelations.

       Such as this:

An unidentified local bank reported a 33 percent nonperforming-loan ratio for the solar-panel industry, compared with 2 percent at the beginning of the year, with the increase due to Wuxi Suntech, China Business News reported in September.

      And this:

China’s lending spree has created a debt burden similar in magnitude to the one that pushed Asian nations into crisis in the late 1990s, according to Fitch Ratings.

As companies take on more debt, the efficiency of credit use has deteriorated. Since 2009, for every yuan of credit issued, China’s GDP grew by an average 0.4 yuan, while the pre-2009 average was 0.8 yuan, according to Mike Werner, a Hong Kong-based analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein & Co.

      And this:

“The real situation is much worse than the data showed” after talking to chief financial officers at industrial manufacturers, said Wendy Tang, a Shanghai-based analyst at Northeast Securities Co., who estimates the actual nonperforming-loan ratio to be as high as 3 percent. “It will take at least one year or longer for these NPLs to appear on banks’ books, and I haven’t seen the bottom of deterioration in Jiangsu and Zhejiang yet.”

      And this:

China’s credit quality started to deteriorate in late 2011 as borrowers took on more debt to serve their obligations amid a slowing economy and weaker income. Interest owed by borrowers rose to an estimated 12.5 percent of China’s economy from 7 percent in 2008, Fitch Ratings estimated in September. By the end of 2017, it may climb to as much as 22 percent and “ultimately overwhelm borrowers.”

Meanwhile, China’s total credit will be pushed to almost 250 percent of gross domestic product by then, almost double the 130 percent of 2008, according to Fitch.

      And this:

Based on current valuations, investors are pricing in a scenario where nonperforming loans at the largest Chinese banks will make up more than 15 percent of their loan books, according to Werner, who forecasts a 2.5 percent to 3.5 percent bad-loan ratio by the end of 2015. A further decline in GDP growth would lead to more soured loans and weaker earnings, he said.

Lenders so far haven’t reported significant deterioration in loan quality. Bank of China said it had 251.3 billion yuan of loans to industries suffering from overcapacity as of the end of June, accounting for 3 percent of the total. Its nonperforming-loan ratio for those businesses stood at 0.93 percent, the same level reported for the entire bank.

All of the above is driven by one main factor – a relentless desire to fund China’s epic scramble into record overcapacity – after all got to keep that goalseeked GDP above 7% somehow – which in turn has resulted in the producers competing themselves right out of solvency:

Shipbuilding isn’t the only industry affected by overcapacity. Also in Jiangsu, about 130 kilometers (80 miles) southwest of Nantong, Wuxi Suntech Power Co., the main unit of the industry’s once-biggest supplier, went bankrupt with 9 billion yuan of debt to China’s largest banks, according to a Nov. 12 report by Communist Party-owned Legal Daily. Suntech Power Holdings Co. (STPFQ), the parent firm, defaulted on $541 million of offshore bonds to Wall Street investors.


Shang Fulin, China’s top banking regulator, this month urged lenders to “seek channels to clean up bad loans by industries with overcapacity to prevent new risks from brewing” and refrain from dragging their feet in dealing with the issue.


Government and banks’ support for the solar industry since late 2008 has resulted in at least one factory producing sun-powered products in half of China’s 600 cities, according to the China Renewable Energy Society in Beijing. China Development Bank, the world’s largest policy lender, alone lent more than 50 billion yuan to solar-panel makers as of August 2012, data from the China Banking Association showed.

China accounts for seven of every 10 solar panels produced worldwide. If they ran at full speed, the factories could produce 49 gigawatts of solar panels a year, 10 times more than in 2008, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Overcapacity has driven down prices to about 84 cents a watt, compared with $2 at the end of 2010. The slump forced dozens of producers like Wuxi Suntech into bankruptcy.

The downside is well-known: should the people not get paid, riots inevitably ensue. This is why the government will keep on bailing out and pretending the local loans are viable, until it no longer can.

“The central government is hawkish in its tone, but when it comes to execution by local governments, the enforcement will be much softer,” Bank of Communications’ Lian said. “Many of these firms are major job providers and taxpayers, so the local government will try all means to save them and help them repay bank loans.”

When hundreds of unpaid Mingde Heavy workers took to the streets for a second time last November, the local government stepped in by lining up other firms to vouch for Mingde so banks would renew its loans. Mingde Heavy avoided failure by entering into an alliance with a shipping unit of government-controlled Jiangsu Sainty Corp., which also imports and exports apparel.

As for the CNY64 trillion question of how much long the government can pretend all is well, the following may be useful.

The nation might face credit losses of as much as $3 trillion as defaults ensue from the expansion of the past four years, particularly by non-bank lenders such as trusts, exceeding that seen prior to other credit crises, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. estimated in August.

In summary: enjoy the relative calm we currently have thanks to Bernanke’s, Kuroda’s (and soon: Draghi’s) epic liquidity tsunami which is rising all leaking boats. The invoice amounting to trillions in bad and non-performing loans around the entire world, and not just in China, is in the mail.


Krisis kredit Juni lalu merupakan tanda besar awal bahwa kredit macet trilyunan dolar Cina tidak bisa lagi disembunyikan.

Kredit macet (NPLs) Cina sungguh mengerikan dan terus meningkat setiap hari.

Kenyataan ini tidak dapat disembunyikan lagi karena sudah muncul ke atas permukaan.

Cina kini mengalami krisis kredit yang sangat serius, mirip dengan krisis AS 2007 yang memicu krisis keuangan global. Siapa pun yang berharap perbaikan di perekonomian Cina akan sia-sia.

Ini memang bukan berarti roda perekonomian Cina akan jatuh.

Apa yang akan terjadi adalah seberapa jauh model pertumbuhan Cina tersebut akan mengandalkan kredit (pinjaman).

Seluruh pencapaiannya yang mudah sudah dilewati, kini pencapaian yang akan diraihnya adalah yang lebih sulit.


Terima kasih sudah membaca dan semoga beruntung.

Dibuat Tanggal 25 November 2013

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Bersiaplah Untuk Kemungkinan Terjadi Lonjakan!

November 25th, 2013 No comments

“The Fed’s determination to print for the foreseeable future in unlimited quantities combined with an emergence of greed overtaking rationality suggest that the final manic phase could be at hand. If we do get the final melt up, it will take the popular indexes to levels much higher than today. Future generations will be writing about it in perpetuity as the largest and most spectacular rise and fall in investing history.”

– Robert Fitzwilson, founder of The Portola Group


Biasanya di periode November hingga April merupakan masa yang paling bagus untuk memegang saham, demikian menurut Ryan Detrick, seorang technical strategist senior di Schaeffer.

Dan memang demikian. Dalam 40 tahun terakhir, rata-rata return S&P di periode November-April adalah di atas 7,5%.

Bahkan, masih menurut Detrick, indeks S&P telah meningkat 79% sepanjang timeframe 6 bulan tersebut.

“September and October are usually bearish, but this year we saw huge gains,”

“When September and October are positive, the returns from November-April are much better. In fact, up 90% of the time!” demikian tandas Detrick.

Jadi jika Anda berada dalam kewaspadaan tinggi sehingga enggan melakukan transaksi, maka kemungkinan akan kehilangan momen (tahun) bersejarah untuk bursa saham.

Richard Russell, seorang penulis media kawakan, belakangan ini memproyeksikan bahwa hyperinflation yang menakutkan akan dialami AS. Dirinya juga membahas tentang bursa saham dalam media hariannya tertanggal 11 November 2013:

“I continue to think that this bull market will end in an upside explosion. I believe it is fated to go higher than anybody now believes. A wise move here might be buy the farthest out calls as possible on the thesis that the sellers are convinced they will never be hit.

Wise heads are now warning that this market has now passed all sane appraisals, and as such it is highly dangerous. Nevertheless I believe that this market is fated to go higher than even the most bullish practitioners can conceive.

Reading my favorite advisories, they are overwhelmingly bearish, from the standpoint of the usual technicals, including the margin accounts, and the number of bullish advisories vs. the thin bears.

All this aside, my instinct tells me that the stock market is heading into the clouds … I sense that the retail public is moving toward an extreme of bullishness, and that all negative indications will be swept aside.

This bull market will not end with the usual and obvious technical indications. It will end with an extreme of bullishness from the crowd.

Kemudian pada tanggal 15 November 2013, Russel melanjutkan tulisannya mengenai kondisi bursa terkini, yang berjudul Get Ready for the Mania Phase:

“We spend our time searching for security and hate it when we get it.” — John Steinbeck.

One of the basics of Dow Theory is the thesis of three psychological phases in both bull and bear markets. In a bull market, which we are now in, the first or initial phase is the early accumulation phase. This is the phase where wise and seasoned investors enter the market at or near the bottom, when many stocks are selling at great values after having been battered for months by the preceding bear market. Here many blue-chip stocks are selling “below known value.”

The second phase of a bull market is usually the longest and most deceptive, containing many secondary reactions. During the second phase the retail public shows interest in stocks, and enters the market carefully and sporadically.

The third or speculative phase of a bull market is characterized by a wild and wooly and ever-increasing entrance by the retail public. This phase is characterized by hot tips, hype and pure greed.

My experience with bull markets is that by the time investors have been tricked and fooled by second phase shenanigans, nobody is ready to think about the possibility of a third speculative phase.

This is where I think we are now in this bull market. I believe that during the next 12 months we will experience a surprising and ever-expanding rush by the “mom and pop” public to enter the market. At the same time, veteran investors and institutions will seize the opportunity to distribute stock that they may have held for years.

All primary movements are international in scope, and this bull market will be no exception. In proof I show one of my favorite items, the “International Dow” known as GDOW (consisting of all 30 Dow Industrials plus 220 international major blue-chip stocks.

Note the sharp correction that occurs in mid-2012, and out of that correction the third, speculative phase of this international bull market began. I expect GDOW to go parabolic sometime in the next two years.


In the meantime, I’m reading dozens of advisories and yes, I note the warnings and technical death traps that are offered by other services. No matter, I think the excitement and greed which has enveloped the retail public will trump the adverse technical warning indicators that are now making their appearance.”

Untuk memperoleh laporan Dow Theory Letters dan laporan harian dari Richard Russell, click here.

Selanjutnya Greg Guenthner, seorang editor pada The Daily Reckoning’s Rude Awakening, yang memberikan saran bagus untuk para investor pada tulisannya tertanggal 7 November 2013 yang berjudul: Don’t Fear the Coming Melt-Up!

Silahkan baca seluruh tulisannya berikut dan amati dengan seksama statistik yang mengatakan bahwa harga-harga saham akan melonjak dalam 2 bulan terakhir:

“Thirty-six trading days are all that remain in 2013.

According to the numbers, the market could rise by 4.5% or more before the final day of December.

So I have to ask…

Are you ready for the melt-up?

You’ve probably heard of the Turkey Day Rally and the Santa Claus Rally– or maybe a combination of the two. That’s no coincidence. Historically, stocks kick it into high gear during the last two months of the year.

Here are the stats:

When the broad market is up 10% or more heading into November and December, the last two months of the year can get a little crazy…

So if history repeats itself this year, we’re in for a good finish. Or maybe one that’s much better than “good”…

“What I didn’t realize was that good may be an understatement,” reads a report from Avondale Asset Management. “The last two months of the year are generally great when the market has been up a lot already in the first ten months.”

Nico-31With just a handful of weeks left in the year, the current 10-month rally in the S&P ranks among the 5th best of all time.

“On average the index has risen by another 4.5% over the final two months. Of the 24 times that this has happened, the index has only fallen in three years,” Avondale reports. “On the other hand there have also been some monster finishes within the data. In 1985 and 1998 the index was up by more than 11% in the final two months.”

Repeat after me:

I will not fear the year-end melt-up. We are in the midst of an historic rally. Dips are buying opportunities…”

Terakhir dari John P. Hussman, PhD, yang adalah presiden dan pemegang saham utama di Hussman Econometrics Advisors, perusahaan konsultan investasi yang mengelola aset-aset dari Hussman Funds (, yang mempertanyakan kondisi saat ini dalam tulisan yang berjudul: What Is Different This Time?

Tulisannya ini masuk dalam kategori WAJIB DIBACA bagi para investor yang serius yang saat ini sangat prihatin mengenai kelestarian dana mereka di tengah ketidakpastian di bursa global:

Investors who believe that history has lessons to teach should take our present concerns with significant weight, but should also recognize that tendencies that repeatedly prove reliable over complete market cycles are sometimes defied over portions of those cycles. Meanwhile, investors who are convinced that this time is different can ignore what follows. The primary reason not to listen to a word of it is that similar concerns, particularly since late-2011, have been followed by yet further market gains. If one places full weight on this recent period, and no weight on history, it follows that stocks can only advance forever.

What seems different this time, enough to revive the conclusion that “this time is different,” is faith in the Federal Reserve’s policy of quantitative easing. Though quantitative easing has no mechanistic relationship to stock prices except to make low-risk assets psychologically uncomfortable to hold, investors place far more certainty in the effectiveness of QE than can be demonstrated by either theory or evidence. The argument essentially reduces to a claim that QE makes stocks go up because “it just does.” We doubt that the perception that an easy Fed can hold stock prices up will be any more durable in the next couple of years than it was in the 2000-2002 decline or the 2007-2009 decline – both periods of persistent and aggressive Fed easing.  But QE is novel, and like the internet bubble, novelty feeds imagination. Most of what investors believe about QE is imaginative.

As Ray Dalio of Bridgwater recently observed,

“The dilemma the Fed faces now is that the tools currently at its disposal are pretty much used up. We think the question around the effectiveness of QE (and not the tapering, which gets all the headlines) is the big deal. In other words, we’re not worried about whether the Fed is going to hit or release the gas pedal, we’re worried about whether there’s much gas left in the tank and what will happen if there isn’t.”

While we can make our case on the basis of fact, theory, data, history, and sometimes just basic arithmetic, what we can’t do – and haven’t done well – is to disabuse perceptions. Beliefs are what they are, and are only as malleable as the minds that hold them. Like the nearly religious belief in the technology bubble, the dot-com boom, the housing bubble, and countless other bubbles across history, people are going to believe what they believe here until reality catches up in the most unpleasant way. The resilience of the market late in a bubble is part of the reason investors keep holding and hoping all the way down. In this market cycle, as in all market cycles, few investors will be able to unload their holdings to the last of the greater fools just after the market’s peak. Instead, most investors will hold all the way down, because even the initial decline will provoke the question “how much lower could it go?” It has always been that way.

The problem with bubbles is that they force one to decide whether to look like an idiot before the peak, or an idiot after the peak. There’s no calling the top, and most of the signals that have been most historically useful for that purpose have been blaring red since late-2011.

As a result, the Shiller P/E (the S&P 500 divided by the 10-year average of inflation-adjusted earnings) is now above 25, a level that prior to the late-1990’s bubble was seen only in the three weeks prior to the 1929 peak. Meanwhile, the price/revenue ratio of the S&P 500 is now double its pre-bubble norm, as is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. Indeed, the median price/revenue ratio of the S&P 500 is actually above the 2000 peak – largely because small cap stocks were much more reasonably priced in 2000 than they are today (not that those better relative valuations prevented wicked losses in small caps during the 2000-2002 decline).

Despite the unusually extended period of speculation as a result of faith in quantitative easing, I continue to believe that normal historical regularities will exert themselves with a vengeance over the completion of this market cycle. Importantly, the market has now re-established the most hostile overvalued, overbought, over bullish syndrome we identify. Outside of 2013, we’ve observed this syndrome at only 6 other points in history: August 1929 (followed by the 85% market decline of the Great Depression), November 1972 (followed by a market plunge in excess of 50%), August 1987 (followed by a market crash in excess of 30%), March 2000 (followed by a market plunge in excess of 50%), May 2007 (followed by a market plunge in excess of 50%), and January 2011 (followed by a market decline limited to just under 20% as a result of central bank intervention).

These concerns are easily ignored since we also observed them at lower levels this year, both in February (see A Reluctant Bear’s Guide to the Universe) and in May. Still, the fact is that this syndrome of overvalued, overbought, over bullish, rising-yield conditions has emerged near the most significant market peaks – and preceded the most severe market declines – in history:

1. S&P 500 Index overvalued, with the Shiller P/E (S&P 500 divided by the 10-year average of inflation-adjusted earnings) greater than 18. The present multiple is actually 25.

2. S&P 500 Index overbought, with the index more than 7% above its 52-week smoothing, at least 50% above its 4-year low, and within 3% of its upper Bollinger bands (2 standard deviations above the 20-period moving average) at daily, weekly, and monthly resolutions. Presently, the S&P 500 is either at or slightly through each of those bands.

3. Investor sentiment over bullish (Investors Intelligence), with the 2-week average of advisory bulls greater than 52% and bearishness below 28%. The most recent weekly figures were 55.2% vs. 15.6%. The sentiment figures we use for 1929 are imputed using the extent and volatility of prior market movements, which explains a significant amount of variation in investor sentiment over time.

4. Yields rising, with the 10-year Treasury yield higher than 6 months earlier.

The blue bars in the chart below depict the complete set of instances since 1970 when these conditions have been observed.


Our investment approach remains to align our investment outlook with the prospective market return/risk profile that we estimate on the basis of prevailing conditions at each point in time. On that basis, the outlook is hard-defensive, and any other stance is essentially speculative. Such speculation is fine with insignificant risk-limited positions (such as call options), but I strongly believe that investors with a horizon of less than 5-7 years should limit their exposure to equities. At this horizon, even “buy-and-hold” strategies in stocks are inappropriate except for a small fraction of assets. In general, the appropriate rule for setting investment exposure for passive investors is to align the duration of the asset portfolio with the duration of expected liabilities. At a 2% dividend yield on the S&P 500, equities are effectively instruments with 50-year duration. That means that even stock holdings amounting to 10% of assets exhaust a 5-year duration. For most investors, a material exposure to equities requires a very long investment horizon and a wholly passive view about market prospects.

Again, our approach is to align our outlook with the prospective return/risk profile we estimate at each point in time. That places us in a defensive stance. Still, we’re quite aware of the tendency for investors to capitulate to seemingly relentless speculation at the very peak of bull markets, and saw it happen in 2000 and 2007 despite our arguments for caution.

As something of an inoculation against this tendency, the chart below presents what we estimate as the most “optimistic” pre-crash scenario for stocks. Though I don’t believe that markets follow math, it’s striking how closely market action in recent years has followed a “log-periodic bubble” as described by Didier Sornette (see Increasingly Immediate Impulses to Buy the Dip).

A log periodic pattern is essentially one where troughs occur at increasingly frequent and increasingly shallow intervals. As Sornette has demonstrated across numerous bubbles over history in a broad variety of asset classes, adjacent troughs (say T1, T2, T3, etc) are often related to the crash date (the “finite-time singularity” Tc) by a constant ratio: (Tc-T1)/(Tc-T2) = (Tc-T2)/(Tc-T3) and so forth, with the result that successive troughs come closer and closer in time until the final blowoff occurs.

Frankly, I thought that this pattern was nearly exhausted in April or May of this year. But here we are. What’s important here is that the only way to extend that finite-time singularity is for the advance to become even more vertical and for periodic fluctuations to become even more closely spaced. That’s exactly what has happened, and the fidelity to the log-periodic pattern is almost creepy. At this point, the only way to extend the singularity beyond the present date is to envision a nearly vertical pre-crash blowoff.

So let’s do that. Not because we should expect it, and surely not because we should rely on it, but because we should guard against it by envisioning the most “optimistic” (and equivalently, the worst case) scenario. So with the essential caveat that we should neither expect, rely or be shocked by a further blowoff, the following chart depicts the market action that would be consistent with a Sornette bubble with the latest “finite time singularity” that is consistent with market action since 2010.


To be very clear: conditions already allow a finite-time singularity at present, the scenario depicted above is the most extreme case, it should not be expected or relied on, but we should also not be shocked or dismayed if it occurs.

Just a final note, which may or may not prove relevant in the weeks ahead: in August 2008, just before the market collapsed (see Nervous Bunny), I noted that increasing volatility of the market at 10-minute intervals was one of the more ominous features of market action. This sort of accelerating volatility at micro-intervals is closely related to log-periodicity, and occurs in a variety of contexts where there’s a “phase transition” from one state to another. Spin a quarter on the table and watch it closely. You’ll notice that between the point where it spins smoothly and the point it falls flat, it will start vibrating uncontrollably at increasingly rapid frequency. That’s a phase transition. Again, I don’t really believe that markets follow math to any great degree, but there are enough historical examples of log-periodic behavior and phase-transitions in market action that it helps to recognize these regularities when they emerge.

Risk dominates. Hold tight.

What Do the Charts Say?

Nadeem Walayat, editor di The Market Oracle (, media analisa dan prospek pasar finansial, belakangan ini termasuk di antara yang bullish.

Dalam laporan berjudul Stock Market Forecast 2014 Crash or Rally?, Walayat memberikan Stock Market Technical Review yang luar biasa seperti berikut ini, disertai juga dengan sebuah grafik menarik:

ELLIOTT WAVES - There is no discernible simple pattern, therefore at this point in time EWT should be ignored.

MACD – Is converging towards a cross which suggests a correction of sorts is imminent, nothing major just unwinding of an overbought state.

TREND ANALYSIS – The stock market is clearly in a rising channel, and has just hit the top of the channel which suggests that the next stop would be the bottom of the range. However the final resolution of this pattern for a bull market is to break out of the range to the upside. So what’s needed to determine is the most probable time for such a breakout which would time well with a Santa rally.

SEASONAL ANALYSIS – December is less than 3 weeks away, the optimum time for Santa’s to deliver their traditional seasonal rallies. The overall seasonal pattern for the Dow is after a weak Sept to October to soar for the next 3-5 months. This year we have had the weak September to October and the stock market is soaring into November. The unfolding seasonal pattern suggests that the stock market could extend its rally all the way into March 2014.

PRICE TARGETS – The immediate target is the upper end of the range on break of which trend trajectory would target at least Dow 17,000, with an extended forecast in my Stocks Stealth Bull Market Ebook implying an eventual Dow bull swing target of 18,000 (FREE DOWNLOAD). On the downside strong channel support comes in along the past highs implying 15,550, 15650 and 15,700 to contain corrections and then further out at Dow 15,000.

Formulating a Stock Market Conclusion

The significant factor in determining a trend forecast conclusion is to consider when the stock market will break out of its rising channel, for the direction of the breakout is set as being UPWARDS because that is the direction that bull markets resolve in. But when ? In terms of probability that would be during a December rally which fits in with the above analysis suggesting a minor correction during the next couple of weeks, to prep the market for a December rally that BREAKS above the channel that would then act as support for the Dow.

Stock Market Forecast Conclusion

I expect the Stock market to break above the upper channel of Dow 15,770 and be trading above 16,000 by late December. Furthermore my analysis suggests that despite a volatile January that will likely bring forward many bankrupt doom merchants, the stock market will likely continue its rally into March 2014, when it is highly probable that the Dow will be trading above 17,000!


Dow 17,000 by March 2014 means that many more bears will be crucified! But seriously, whatever actually transpires, understand this that probability favors RISING stock prices into March 2014.


Terakhir adalah kesimpulan yang saya ambil dari Lance Roberts di STA Wealth Management, dalam artikelnya yang terbaru:

“The third stage of bull markets, the mania phase, can last longer and go farther that logic would dictate.  However, the data suggests that the risk of a more meaningful reversion is rising.  However, it is necessary to note that “reversions” do not occur without a catalyst.  What will that catalyst be?  I have no idea and nor does anyone else.  Things that we are already aware of, like the upcoming debt ceiling debate, are already factored into the market.

It is unknown, unexpected and unanticipated events that strike the crucial blow that begins the market rout.  Unfortunately, due to the increased impact of high frequency and program trading, reversions are likely to occur faster than most can adequately respond to.  This is the danger that exists today.

Are we in the third phase of a bull market?  Most who read this article will say “no.”  However, those were the utterances made at the peak of every previous bull market cycle.  The reality is that, as investors, we should consider the possibility, evaluate the risk and manage accordingly.”

Personal note:

Sentimen ekstrim bisa terus berkeliaran di pasar karena kita sudah masuk di penghujung 2013. Namun selama harga belum anjlok dan runtuh, maka kenaikan masih mungkin berlanjut.

Jika Anda bertanya apa yang sebaiknya dilakukan saat ini, maka yang saya akan sarankan adalah lebih pada membatasi investasi atau penggunaan dana Anda pada aset yang memiliki VALUASI MENGGIURKAN dan memiliki karakter ‘DEFENSIVE’, daripada menarik seluruhnya dari bursa saham.

Namun demikian, harus diingat bahwa saat ini harga-harga saham sudah 25 kali earning mereka, sehingga mengindikasikan bahwa bursa saham AS benar-benar sangat overvalued.

Karena bursa saham AS adalah yang terbesar di dunia, maka jika terjadi penurunan maka akan turut menyeret bursa saham lainnya di dunia.

Seperti biasa di akhir tulisan agar Anda tetap ceria, berikut adalah 2 gambar lucu:


(h/t IBD via The Burning Platform)

Nico-36(h/t Sunday Funnies via The Burning Platform blog)

Terima kasih sudah membaca dan semoga beruntung!

Dibuat Tanggal 20 November 2013

Categories: Pasar Internasional Tags:

‘Gold Bugs’ Harus Lebih Bersabar Lagi

November 19th, 2013 No comments

“I would say gold is now poised to go much, much higher than any potential downside, and so the risk/reward is very favorable as I see it right here. One of the major things that is getting in the way is a real market value play. The US dollar is still relatively strong vs. other fiat currencies, and when the dollar is strong it gets in the way of gold being an outlet for all fiat holders across the globe. The impulsive move is to go out of euros, yen, rand, or whatever it may be, and into dollars rather than going straight into gold. When the dollar is strong, when there is flight into the dollar as there has been recently, it implies there is no immediate need to have gold ascend as the sovereign currency.”

 – Paul Brodsky, co-founder of QB Asset Management


Apakah penurunan harga emas akan berlanjut lebih jauh?

Perilaku pasar belakangan ini menjelaskan semuanya.

Meskipun para investor menggoyang bursa saham ke sisi negatif dan positif beberapa hari ini, tidak demikian dengan harga emas yang gagal mempertahankan kenaikan sebelumnya dan justru kembali berada di bawah level support penting $1300.

Saya sarankan agar Anda perhatikan dengan seksama harga emas pekan ini, karena jika gagal naik kembali ke atas $1300 maka tekanan jual lebih besar akan menantinya.

Melangkahlah dengan hati-hati saat ini, saya perkirakan tekanan jual akan meningkat di kuartal terakhir 2013 ini jika emas terus bertahan di bawah $1300.

Jadi meskipun periode November hingga Januari biasanya merupakan periode terkuat untuk harga emas, seperti yang Anda lihat pada grafik di bawah ini, kewaspadaan diperlukan:


Hari ini saya punya sejumlah laporan luar biasa untuk Anda, yang tentunya dengan sejumlah grafik menarik, namun sebelumnya saya ingin mengingatkan ke Anda bahwa emas dalam jangka panjang mungkin akan  menjadi salah satu aset terbaik yang akan mempertahankan kekayaan Anda.

Ronald-Peter Stoferle dari Incrementum AG Lichtenstein di akhir Oktober lalu kepada King World News ( memberikan 2 grafik dan laporan menarik yang menjelaskan mengapa emas akan meningkat sebagai mata uang utama dunia.

“If you can’t explain it to a six-year-old, you don’t understand it yourself.”  Albert Einstein

What is the major virtue of gold in contrast to paper currencies?  From our point of view, the current and future purchasing power of money not only depends on how much is available now, but also on how the quantity is expected to change over time….

The supply curve of gold changes only incrementally every year.  While scrap supply is volatile and sensitive to price changes, mine production is extremely inelastic.  Having a look at the following chart, one can see this “relative scarcity” of gold.  Since 1868, the average annual “gold inflation” was only 2.1 %, while the monetary aggregate M2 grew at 6.6%.  Moreover, M2′s historical volatility was also far higher, it ranged from minus 15.6% to plus 26%, while that of gold ranged only between 1.4% and a maximum of 3.5%.

See Maximum, Minimum and Average Rate of Change of Gold versus Money Supply M2: 1868 to 2011 Below:


Now what does this actually mean?  If the annual mine production were to double (which is highly unlikely from our point of view), this would translate into an annual increase of only 3% in the supply of gold.  This is still a very minor inflation of total gold reserves, especially compared to current rates of dilution of paper currencies.

We always remarked that the extremely high stock-to-flow ratio is the most important characteristic of gold.  The aggregate volume of all the gold ever produced comes to about 172,000 tons.  This is the stock.  Annual production was close to 2,700 tons in 2012.  That is the flow.  Dividing the former by the latter, we receive the stock-to-flow ratio of 64 years.


I therefore assume that gold is not so precious because it’s scarce, but because the opposite is true: gold is precious because the annual production is so low relative to the stock.  This stability and security is a crucial precondition for creating confidence.  Gold has acquired this feature over centuries, and cannot lose it anymore.

“It’s all about relative supply curves – the supply curve for bullion is far more inelastic than is the case for paper money.  It really is that simple.” David Rosenberg

What Do the Charts Say?

Selain itu, ada 3 laporan lagi yang akan menjelaskan kepada Anda mengapa harga emas masih akan turun lebih jauh dari levelnya saat ini.

Yang pertama adalah Adam O’Dell dari Ahead of the Curve, yang menyatakan masih ada penurunan 25% lagi pada harga emas:

Wednesday, October 23, 2013

 “Yes, gold’s drop still has further to go.

For one, bubbled markets nearly always return to the price they were prior to the bubble forming. That puts gold futures at least as low as $500, where they traded in 2003.

And some Fibonacci analysis shows that even the minimum pullback expected from the prior bull market has not yet been accomplished. Take a look…


Gold’s dead cat bounce at $1,200 per ounce wasn’t all that surprising. The shiny metal had dropped nearly 40% in less than two years and $1,200 per ounce was the 50% Fibonacci retracement level… a natural place for gold’s downward spiral to take a breather.

As you can see above, the next stop on this train-ride to the bottom is the $1,000 to $1,050 per ounce range. This represents the 61.8% Fibonacci retracement level, and a support level based on price patterns that emerged in 2008 and 2009.

That puts about us $330 per ounce, or a 25% drop, below the current price. I think we’ll easily hit this target in 2014.”

Kedua dari Dominic Frisby dari MoneyWeek mencoba menjelaskan pergerakan emas berikutnya:

“MoneyWeek magazine’s house view on gold is that you should hold it as insurance – 5-10% in your portfolio.

This is to offer you some protection from the eventual inflation that central bankers are keen to unleash on the world

But what if – like me – you’re rather more exposed to gold than that?

This morning (October 23, 2013) I want to take a look at what’s next for the yellow metal…

Like it or not, the trend for gold is down

When it comes to gold, the technicals and the fundamentals are shouting very different messages.

We’ll start with the technicals – the study of the price. When all is said and done, you can’t argue with the price.

The chart below shows gold since 2006. I have identified the broader trend – the general direction – using blue tramlines. In simple terms, what was heading up, is now heading down.


Long-time readers might remember how I used the 144-day simple moving average (144 DMA) to catch the lows in gold as it moved up between 2008 and 2011. This proved a useful tool.

But it is now working in reverse. As gold trends lower, the 144 DMA is now catching the highs. In the chart below the gold price is in black, and the 144 DMA is in red. Gold’s recent rally above $1,400 an ounce stalled right on it.


Gold’s is currently enjoying a mini-surge. The implication of the above chart is that said surge will fizzle out when gold reaches that 144 DMA, currently at $1,367 and falling.

Nobody wants the gold price to rally more than I do. But I cannot argue with the trend. And, for the moment, that trend is down.

Trends can last for many years. They can defy logic, reason and fundamentals. But they do not go on forever.

Perhaps the June lows of $1,180 marked the bottom. I hope so. It’s possible a new trend is forming now.

But until gold can get above the 144 DMA, and said moving average turns up, and until gold can break above the range identified by the falling blue tram lines in the first chart, it will remain, by my analysis, in a downtrend.”

Yang terakhir yang tak kalah penting ini masuk dalam kategori laporan yang WAJIB DIBACA!! Jordan Roy Byrne, atau sering disebut dengan ‘the Trendsman’, memiliki sejumlah grafik luar biasa yang memberikan ilustrasi mengapa: the gold bear is going to end with a bang.

Sebagai informasi saja bahwa trendsman adalah anggota afiliasi the Market Technicians Association (MTA) dan telah menyelesaikan CMT Program yang menyatakan profesionalitas di bidang technical analysis, jadi memang dia sangat menguasai dan mengetahui apa yang dikatakannya berikut ini:

“For months we’ve been writing about the major bottom to come in precious metals. It appeared we finally saw it in late June as the metals and the stocks surged during the summer. Yet, these markets trailed off in August and it continued into October. The equities were down seven straight weeks. That gave way to an oversold bounce. Unless precious metals can close above their October highs on a weekly basis, the outlook remains bearish. While this bear market is finally coming to an end, don’t expect it to end quietly. At present Gold looks eerily similar to both Gold in 1976 and the SYP in 2009 prior to their major bottoms.

The first chart below shows Gold in 1975 to 1976. Gold’s sudden decline that began in August 1975 took it from over $160/oz down to $128/oz. It was a 20% drop in one month. After it rebounded it formed a marginal new low (A) and traded around $130 for about five months. Once Gold failed at the declining 50-day moving average and lateral resistance it plummeted to its final low.


Gold in 2013 has formed a very similar pattern. The first panic low occurred in April which was followed by another low several months later. Gold then recovered back above the first panic low to point B. Point C labels the decline below the first panic low and a temporary bottom. Just like in summer 1976, Gold rallied up to a strong confluence of resistance (lateral and 50-day moving average) and failed.


I’ve aligned both of the above plots on the same scale starting with their first panic low. The blue is Gold in 1975-1976 and the black is today. The 1976 template has Gold bottoming in early March. However, we can clearly see that Gold today is a few months ahead of that.


Next, take a look at the S&P bottom from 2008-2009. It followed the exact same pattern!


Let’s compare the three situations. In Gold from 1975-1976 its bearish consolidation (from first panic low to failure at resistance) lasted nine months and its final decline lasted two months. In the S&P 500 from 2008-2009 its bearish consolidation lasted only four months and its final decline lasted no more than four weeks. Gold’s bearish consolidation lasted about six and a half months. Judging from this data we could project Gold’s bottom to come in about six weeks.

There are a few more important things to note. Gold from 1975-1976 had a very weak rally from point A to B. It was in a weaker position and then consolidated for the longest. That is why it had the steepest final decline. The S&P in 2009 consolidated for only four months. When it broke to a new low, it made its final low the next week. Like the S&P 500, Gold today had a stronger rally from point A to B. Also, unlike the other two, Gold today has been in a bear market for over two years. Considering these things, I’d expect Gold’s final bottom to be more similar to the S&P in 2009 than Gold in 1976.

Unless Gold is able to close above $1350 in the near-term on a weekly basis then consider the short-term trend bearish. Gold looks set to plunge to its final bottom. Gold bugs will cry manipulation, CNBC and Twitter types will be mocking the Peter Schiffs of the world and many will be calling for $900 Gold. I urge you to avoid all this nonsense and focus on one thing. Get yourself in position to take advantage of this bottom. It’s the very smart money that is looking forward to buying this bottom. I suspect the coming bottom will be the one the typical huge rebounds originate from.”


Grant Williams, seorang portfolio manager di Vulpes Precious Metals Fund, belum lama ini memberikan rangkuman mengenai dimana posisi kita saat ini, dan juga menjelaskan akhir permainan saat sistem moneter hancur:

“If you take everything out of the equation – take manipulation out of the equation, whether it be in bond or currency markets, or the gold market, and you just look at the numbers and the facts, it’s very, very clear that a lot of what’s going on is unsustainable.

The debt and unfunded liabilities are unsustainable. A lot of the banks are insolvent. Anyone who can actually step back and take a level-headed, cold, hard look at the numbers can see all of these things. But at the moment it doesn’t matter.

People are OK saying, ‘Let’s keep this charade going because the reality of it is too painful.’ But at some point you can’t pull the levers anymore, and you can’t move things around, and you can’t cover things up. Ultimately, the numbers are going to matter, and when it comes down to pure, cold, simple mathematics, this is unsustainable.

And when it all goes, I’m afraid it’s all going to go at once because the math is just going to fall like dominoes. And at that point, if you are not sitting there with some gold in your portfolio, all you have left, essentially, are paper assets, and they are going to be worth a lot less than you think they are.”

Personal note: Untuk saat ini saya masih bearish terhadap emas. Dalam 1 hingga 3 bulan mendatang, kita mungkin akan menyaksikan pergerakan harga yang kuat yang akan memberikan kita entry point yang sangat bagus.

Singkatnya, kita perlu menyaksikan dahulu sebuah break out atau pola bottoming sebelum kita masuk posisi ke pasar emas.

Saya tahu bahwa orang-orang sangat ingin memanfaatkan logam mulia karena adanya kembali prospek kenaikan besar, namun kadang menunggu adalah suatu hal terbaik sampai ada indikasi kenaikan sebelum mengambil posisi transaksi baru.

Dan bagi mereka yang ingin membeli emas fisik, jangan sampai potensi penurunan harga emas lebih lanjut ini menghalangi Anda, tapi jadikan ini sebagai peluang yang menguntungkan untuk Anda.

Dengan membeli emas sekarang ini serta bertahap dalam beberapa bulan ke depan, maka Anda dapat mengimbangi dollar-cost Anda ke dalam emas dan menekan biaya serta resiko Anda.

Seperti biasa, di akhir tulisan saya akan mengetengahkan sejumlah gambar lucu agar Anda tetap ceria.

Gambar-gambar berikut menunjukkan bahwa sering hal-hal yang tidak dikatakan justru menjadi masalah…:



(via Sunday Funnies)

 Terima kasih sudah membaca dan semoga beruntung!

Dibuat 12 November 2013

Categories: Emas Tags:

Apakah Bursa Saham AS Sudah Masuk Wilayah ‘Bubble’?

November 12th, 2013 No comments

“There’s no one in the stock market today except drugged up day-traders and robots. This is utterly irrational. We’re in the fourth bubble inflated by the Fed in this century but now we have the greatest, mother of all bubbles. How could someone in their right mind believe that you can have interest rates at zero for nine years? That is the greatest gift to the speculators, to the 1%, to the leveraged traders, to the carry trade ever imagined! We’re almost on the edge of another explosion at the present time.”

– David Stockman, the author of The Age of Deformation


“I will address the issue of a stock market bubble next week, but there is a tease and fascinating piece of data: Since 1990, the P/E multiple of the S&P 500 has appreciated by about 2% a year; in 2013, the S&P’s P/E has increased by 18%!”

– Doug Kass

Saya harus mengakui bahwa saya mulai merasa sedikit gelisah tentang hal-hal terakhir ini saat melihat data yang dirilis optimis karena berarti bahwa ekonomi membaik maupun QE akan dilanjutkan.

Hal Itu sungguh tidak akan mengganggu saya jika pendapatan perusahaan masih menunjukkan booming-nya dan pertumbuhan ekonomi masih kuat, tapi tak satu pun yang terjadi.

Bahkan, kenaikan pasar ditunjang hanya oleh optimisme semata terhadap kelanjutan QE dan beberapa hal lain

Lance Roberts dari STA Wealth Management juga turut prihatin terhadap hal tersebut, yang dijelaskannya dalam tulisan yang berjudul “There is No Asset Bubbel?”:

 “While it is certainly conceivable that the markets could attain all-time highs. The speculative appetite, combined with the Fed’s liquidity, is a powerful combination in the short term. However, the increase in speculative risks combined with excess leverage leave the markets vulnerable to a sizable correction at some point in the future.

The only missing ingredient for such a correction currently is simply a catalyst to put “fear” into an overly complacent marketplace.

In the long term, it will ultimately be the fundamentals that drive the markets. Currently, the deterioration in the growth rate of earnings and economic strength are not supportive of the speculative rise in asset prices or leverage. The idea of whether, or not, the Federal Reserve, along with virtually every other central bank in the world, are inflating the next asset bubble is of significant importance to investors who can ill afford to lose a large chunk of their net worth.

It is all reminiscent of the market peak of 1929 when Dr. Irving Fisher uttered his now famous words: “Stocks have now reached a permanently high plateau.”

Does an asset bubble currently exist? Ask anyone and they will adamantly say ‘NO.’ However, maybe it is precisely that tacit denial which might be an indication of its existence.”

Saya juga punya banyak laporan Tyler Durden dari

Mari baca dengan seksama tulisan-tulisannya beserta sejumlah grafik yang luar biasa, dan bertindaklah yang sesuai:

1)    Buying Stocks On Margin At The Top – They Never Learn (October 24th)

      Submitted by Jim Quinn of The Burning Platform blog,

It’s like the movie Groundhog Day. Greed and hubris are the downfall of the mighty. Believing it is different this time is the mistake of the feeble minded. Watching the ensuing carnage will be a laugh riot. Seeing the blubbering of the bubble headed bimbos, pinhead pundits and Wall Street shysters when the inevitable collapse occurs will be worth the price of admission. If you think we’re wrong, pony up to the trough, borrow some money and buy Twitter on IPO day. You can’t lose.



Of course, “this time is different…”

2)    “A Market Likely To Suck Everyone In To Its Last Updraft” (October 27th)

      From Sean Corrigan Of Diapason Commodities Management

      Material Evidence

At present the whole world is happy to treat the post-Shutdown US as a Goldilocks fable. Herein, such good macro numbers as do occur are either deemed an aberration soon to reversed as the supposed disruption of the budget dispute filters its way into the reckoning, or else they serve to underpin the assumptions of higher earnings to come. Weaker ones – like the just-released NFP – are also welcome for their prophylactic effect since they can only continue to disarm an already bedraggled flock of Fed hawks, leaving the rest of us hoarsely Yellen for more.

So, in the run-up to book closing, we may see everyone scramble out to their waiting Sopwith, silk scarf flapping jauntily in the slipstream of the ‘crate’s’ spinning propellers, to the exultant cryof, “Chocks away, Ginger!? Off will go our heroes, soaring not so much to a tumult in the clouds as to the wide, blue yonder of ever higher equity prices and ever fatter bonus cheques.

Ye Gods! Even that discredited old hack, Alan Greenspan – the man who bears as much responsibility as anyone for the hypertrophy of state-supported finance and thus for the havoc it continues to wreak – is at it, trying to tell us that because of a low ‘equity premium’ (read: ludicrously intervention-depressed bond yields), the ‘momentum’ of stocks ‘is still relatively up’.

Such a market is therefore likely to suck everyone in to its last, Plinian updraft no matter how stretched everything becomes and no matter how great the risk of being cast into perdition in the pyroclastic collapse to come. That said, one cannot fail to be tempted by the fact that margin debt is in the stratosphere (a new dollar high and a fraction of market cap only outdone in QI’00); sentiment is heavily bullish (the AAII Bull-Bear index is at levels only once beaten to any significant degree in the past since the start of 2006; while that same index multiplied by stock prices is in the 97th percentile of a quarter-century sample), put-call skews are high and vols are low.

In turn, this means that our favourite ‘Blue Sky’ indices (index levels divided by volatility measures, such as OEX/VXO) are off the charts. Indeed, that particular example is now 2.7 sigmas over a 28-year mean, in a 99th percentile which has only once been surpassed, at the start of 2007, before the first rumblings of the CDO cyclone and subprime tsunami were audible to any but the most perceptive listener. In Germany, the DAX/VDAX equivalent sits at a major, new 21-year high, a whopping 3.7 sigmas over its period mean.


There are one or two other technical signals, too. The S&P500 ex-financials has all but completed a handsome-looking long-term profile during the DDIE. The financials, meanwhile, have retraced 50% of their LEH-AIG meltdown. Nasdaq has been on one of Didier Sornette’s exponential accelerations, climbing more ever more rapidly on ever shorter timeframes up into the top few percent of another clean, projected top mapped out off the 2009 lows. Looking further back in time, since that same 2009 nadir, the DJIA has ascended by an amount only exceeded in the run up to 1920, 1929, 1937, 1987, and 2000 – all of them major tops. Juicy!

What we must caution here, however, is that anyone tempted to lean into this particular wind must have the patience to wait for signs of even a temporary exhaustion before setting shorts. Critical, too, will be the discipline to stop out if and when those initial selling ‘tails’ start to fill back in, for fear that this is a signal that the mania has not yet ended and that the buyers of dips are still all too dominant.

3)    A “Frothy”, “Overbullish”, “Overbought”, “Overmargined” Market With “Not Enough Bears” – In Charts (November 3 rd)

Last week, Bank of America warned that “it’s getting frothy, man” based on the sheer surge of fund flows into equities. Here is the same firm with some other observations on what can simply be described as a “frothy”, “overbought”, “overmargined” market with “not enough bears.”

      From Bank of America:

            “Daily slow stochastic is generating an overbought sell signal.”


“Based on the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) Bulls to Bears ratio investors are more bullish now than they were in late May and mid July. In terms of sentiment, this is a contrarian bearish condition. Since April, near-term peaks and troughs in AAII Bull/Bears have coincided with near-term market peaks and troughs.”


Bears drops to 16.5% = too few bears;  As of October 25, Investors Intelligence (II) % Bears extended deeper into contrarian bearish territory below the 20% level with a reading of 16.5%. This is down from 18.5% the prior week and the lowest level for II % Bears since April 2011 – this suggests too few bears among newsletter writers. II % Sentiment is an equity market risk and confirms the complacent readings for the 5-day put/call ratios.


NYSE margin debt at record high; confirms S&P 500 high; As of September 2013 NYSE margin debt stood at a new record high of $401.2b and exceeded the prior high from April of $384.4b. This confirms the new S&P 500 highs and negates the bearish 2013 set up that was similar to the bearish patterns seen at the prior highs from 2000 and 2007, where a peak in margin debt preceded important S&P 500 peaks.


Risk: Net free credit at $-111b & back at 2000 extremes; Net free credit is free credit balances in cash and margin accounts net of the debit balance in margin accounts. At $111b, this measure of cash to meet margin calls is at an extreme low or negative reading not seen since the February 2000 low of $-129b. The risk is if the market drops and triggers margin calls, investors do not have cash and would be forced to sell stocks to meet the margin calls. This would exacerbate an equity market sell-off.


Then again, do any of these technicals matter? Of course not: only the size of the Fed’s balance sheet does.

4)    Bob Janjuah: “Bubble Still Building” (November 5th)

      After a five month absence, Bob Janjuah is back.

      Bob’s World – Bubble Still Building

      From Nomura

Since I last wrote markets have largely followed the path I set out in June. At the time I was looking for the risk sell-off that began in May (and which was sparked by Fed Chairman Bernanke’s tapering comments) to result in the S&P falling from 1687 to no lower than 1530 in Q2/Q3, and then I expected the S&P to rally (driven by the Fed’s inevitable subsequent concerns on tapering, which I felt would see the Fed heavily water down its tapering message) all the way to the high 1700s/1800 in Q3/Q4.

By way of review: The Q2/Q3 sell-off stopped with an S&P low print at 1560 in late June; the Fed got so concerned about tapering over Q3 that it not only heavily watered down its tapering message, it abandoned it (for now!) altogether; the subsequent rally I expected has seen the S&P trade to a Q4 2013 high (so far) of 1775. Overall, my forecast set out in my June note turned out to be accurate.

      Now that my Q3/Q4 targets have been hit an update is due:

1 – As per my June (and earlier) note(s), from a TIME perspective I still see end Q4 2013, through to end Q1 2014, as the window in which we see a significant risk-on top before giving way, over the last three quarters of 2014 and through 2015, to what could be a 25% to 50% sell-off in global stock markets. From a LEVEL perspective, my 1800 target for the S&P into the aforementioned ‘peak’ time window (Q4 2013/Q1 2014) has pretty much already been hit. As I expect marginal higher highs before the big reversal, and while my target for this high in the S&P over the next five months remains anchored around 1800, an ‘extreme’ upside target could see the S&P trade up to 1850. Put it another way – before we see any big risk reversal over 2014 and 2015, we need to see more complacency in markets. I am looking – as a proxy guide – for the VIX index to trade down at 10 between now and end Q1 2014 before I would recommend large-scale positioning for a major risk reversal over the last three quarters of 2014 and over 2015.

2 – The major themes are unchanged – anemic global growth/mediocre fundamentals, what I consider to be extraordinarily and dangerously loose (monetary) policy settings, very poor global demographics, excessive debt, an enormous misallocation of capital driven by the state sponsored mispricing of money/capital, and excessive financial market/asset price speculation at the expense of any benefit to the real economy. In the context of growth surely I am not the only person surprised at policymakers, especially in the UK and the US, where seemingly the only solution to massive financial market and economic failures is to resort to more of the same of what caused the original problems – namely debt-driven consumption, debt-driven asset price speculation, and the expansion of the ‘Ponzi’ that best describes our modern day economic ‘model’. Personally I do not think the recent mini outbreak of growth optimism is sustainable, primarily because this optimism is based on more leverage and more asset price speculation, which in turn is based upon a set of policies (easy money) that are not credible nor consistent over any ‘real economy’ time frame that really matters. Shorter-term speculation/trading gains are a different matter of course!

3 – Between now and the end of Q1 2014, when I expect to see a major higher high in the S&P in the 1800/1850 range, I would also caution that we could see an interim sell-off that may surprise. Specifically I feel that between now and year-end, especially over the rest of November, we could see a risk-off period that, for example, takes the S&P from 1775 to perhaps 1650/1700, or even as low as the 1600/1650 area. The key here is that, I think in the very short term, markets have priced out pretty much all the risk in markets, and have priced in pretty much all the ‘good’ news. As such I feel sentiment and positioning are currently very vulnerable, especially to any unexpected bad news out of China, out of the euro zone, out of Japan/’Abe-nomics’, and in particular on the confirmation of Janet Yellen by the Senate. If we do get a decent risk-off period in November, I would buy this dip on a tactical basis into the 1800/1850 S&P high target I have for Q4 2013/Q1 2014.

4 – Beyond Q1 2014, the longer term will all likely be driven by the growth data and the credibility of policymakers and what seems like an all-in ‘bet’ on QE as the solution to our ills. It is easy to argue that the major real impact of this policy has merely been to make the rich – the top 10% – ‘richer’, at the expense of the remaining 90%. It seems pretty obvious to many that while the last five years has all been about policymakers being ‘reverse hijacked’ by financial markets and financial market players (the ‘top’ 10%), the next five years HAS to be about a rebalancing towards the ‘real economy’ and the bottom 90%, at the expense of the top 10%. This shift in policy emphasis will not be a happy time for financial markets and speculators while the transition happens, but in the very long term will be seen as a major positive event, in my view. Certainly, the alternative (and current policy) of waiting for some mythical wealth trickle down impact to take us back to the seemingly good old (debt driven) days of the 00s is, in the long run, a delusion that is also likely to result in another financial market and economic failure to rival the very failure we are still, five years on, trying to address!

5 – As mentioned above, the VIX index at 10 would, to me, indicate that the time is then right to get seriously positioned for a major risk reversal, but until then any Q4 2013 dip (as per 3 above) would to me represent a buying opportunity into my expected high in Q1 2014. As a stop loss for this Q4 2013/Q1 2014 high, consecutive weekly closes in the S&P500 above 1850 would stop me out.

To answer the question I get asked the most right now: What in terms of financial assets, would I own NOW if I had to hold it for a year? My answer remains strong balance-sheet corporate credit spread (yields may be expensive, but spreads are not), Italian government debt, and the USD (esp. vs. JPY). As one never knows, I’d also have small speculative ‘long-risk’ positions in bank equity, via options, just in case the speculative bubble takes longer to peak and peaks at levels even higher than forecast above.


5)    Chart Of The Day: Bernanke Has Officially Created The Bizarro Market (November 6th)

Over the past year there has been some confusion about whether Ben Bernanke has managed to not only completely break the stock market (which, if one harkens back to hallowed antiquity used to discount good or bad news in the future, and “trade” accordingly), but also invert it fully. The chart below from Guggenheim will once and for all put any such confusion to rest.

As Guggenheim’s Scott Minderd points out “The 52-week correlation between S&P 500 returns and the change in the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index has plunged from 0.45 to -0.13 over the past 12 months. A negative correlation indicates that weak U.S. economic data tends to push equity prices higher, while strong economic data tends to send them lower.

      What’s the explanation?

In a similar manner to 2005, when the Federal Reserve raised interest rates by 200 basis points in a year, the current plunge in this correlation indicates that the expectation of continued monetary accommodation has trumped economic fundamentals to become the main factor determining the near-term outlook for U.S. equities.

In short: a broken, inverted market, driven purely and entirely by hopes of an even bigger liquidity bubble, and even more greater fools to offload to.


And that, in a nutshell, is your “market.”

6)    IPOs Have Only Had A Better Year Once – 1999 (November 7th)

We previously discussed what happened the last time that IPOs were outperforming the broad market by as much as they are now but thanks to the exuberance of the last month, it seems we have broken another ‘record’. Year-over-year absolute gains in Bloomberg’s IPO index have only been higher once in history – in 1999; and current levels have been notable resistance for the exuberant spurts of the last 6 years


The Bloomberg IPO Index (US) is a capitalization-weighted index which measures the performance of stocks during their first publicly traded year. It includes all companies with a market value of at least $50 million at the initial public offering.

      (h/t Brad Wishak at NewEdge)

7)    The Stunning Magic Of “New Normal” Hedge Fund Leverage (November 8th)

The following chart, from the Balyasny Asset Management Q3 letter to investors, shows just that: the magic of hedge fund leverage in the New Normal.

Specifically, it shows that while BAM’s AUM from 2010 until Q3 2013 has increased only modestly (light blue), it is the dark blue bar portion that shows just how much “purchasing power”, i.e., allocation, has been deployed by the fund, thanks to the good graces of its Prime Brokers, who have allowed it expand its leverage from 100% to nearly 500%! Compare this to the peak leverage in the old normal which was roughly half: yes, that was at a time when the so-called credit bubble exploded. It has now doubled.

Nico-11From BAM:

During our soft-close period over the last two years, we have doubled the size of our allocations and our balance sheet while keeping AUM roughly the same. Our plan is to accept only enough new capital to allow us to keep our assets / notional dollars allocated ratio at 1 to 5.

We find that portfolio managers on average utilize about 70-80% of their maximum allocations – so $1 of assets to $5 in notional allocated dollars typically results in our target gross leverage of 3.5-4x. We will be very disciplined with this so please let us know as early as possible if you are interested in increasing your allocation next year.

      Of course, when one is levered nearly 5x, being “very disciplined” is usually a good idea.

But who would be on the hook should things turn south, and the massive leverage blows up in the face of Balyasny and its LPs? Not Balyasny of course, but the Prime Brokers who provided the fund with 5x leverage. Prime Brokers who just happen to be the same TBTF banks that were bailed out last time around, and which will have to be bailed out once again as soon as the Bernanke levitation finally ends.

But most importantly, the chart shows quite clearly that without any new equity injections in the market, the one and only source of incremental “capital” injected into risk assets is, you guessed it, debt.

8)    The Anatomy Of A Pre-Crash Bubble (November 8th)

We previously highlighted Didier Sornette’s excellent work trying to identify pre-crash conditions in financial markets and John Hussman’s chart below suggests we are indeed heading that way. His warning, however, “Don’t rely on further blow-off – but don’t be shocked – risk dominates… Hold Tight.


Via @Hussmanjp

Di akhir laporan panjang hari ini, agar tetap ceria, saya persembahkan sejumlah gambar lucu dari William Banzai:




Terima kasih sudah membaca dan semoga beruntung!

Dibuat 11 November 2013

Categories: Pasar Internasional Tags:

Apakah Bursa Saham AS Akan Jatuh?

November 12th, 2013 No comments

“Stocks have performed impressively this year and have largely been able to hold on to gains despite monetary and fiscal uncertainties and the less than inspiring economic and earnings pictures. In a price-earnings framework for the market, most of the gains this year have resulted from investors’ willingness to pay a higher multiple for pretty much the same, or even lower, earnings. Reasonable people can disagree over the extent of the Fed’s role in the market’s upward push, but few would argue that the Bernanke Fed’s easy-money policy has been a key, if not the only, driver of this trend. If nothing else, the Fed policy of deliberately low interest rates pushed investors into riskier assets, including stocks.”

– Sheraz Mian, Director of Research for Zacks Investment Research


“Investors and traders have become programmed to believe that QE (rather than economic growth) is enough to launch asset prices ever-higher. At the moment, there is little to refute this view. “Melt-up” mentality is back. However, shouldn’t a sluggish economy with slow job creation make investors questionwhether enough economic activity will be generated to justify prices?

– Guy Haselmann of Scotiabank

Sebelum lebih jauh ke pokok pembahasan kali ini, saya ingin mengingatkan para pembaca bahwa volume perdagangan dalam beberapa hari terakhir mengalami penurunan, padahal di saat yang sama indeks S&P 500 terus naik, seperti terlihat dalam grafik di bawah ini:


Chart: Bloomberg

Sungguh bukan merupakan gambaran bursa yang sehat, kan?

Mark Spitznagel, penulis The Dao of Capital, baru-baru ini menjelaskan alasan keyakinannya bahwa “bursa akan mengalami kejatuhan besar” dan memperkirakan penurunan harga saham akan mencapai 40%.

Kondisi bursa saat ini sangat dipengaruhi oleh kebijakan suku bunga rendah dan program stimulus yang agresif. Bersama dengan valuasi dan sentimen, kondisi tersebut telah mendistorsi bursadengan cara yang sama ‘pada setiap pencapaian di puncak-puncak utamanya sepanjang sejarah.

Saran investasinya sederhana saja, “step aside!”

Namun dia tidak berharap banyak dari sarannya tersebut, karena menurutnya “it is the hardest thing to do right now, “and makes you look like a fool.”

Kemudian juga Albert Edwards, analis terkemuka di Societe Generale, yang benar-benar tidak memiliki sentimen bullish untuk kondisi bursa saat ini.

Berikut penjelasannya disertai dengan sebuah grafik menarik:

“Only the brave can react to what they see and leave the markets. The global macro looks an appalling mess and even more importantly, long-term equity investors can find nothing worth buying. For equity investors we are closer to 2007 than 2001 as the vast bulk of the equity market, as represented by the median PE, PB or Price/Sales, is expensive. The US median price/sales ratio is at a record high, indicating that there is practically nothing cheap in the equity market left to buy.”


Selanjutnya Damien Cleusix yang telah memberikan peringatan jelas pada para kliennya bahwa “it is really going to end badly” dan dia yakin saat ini kita sudah berada di puncak secular bull market.

Yang krusial adalah bahwa kondisi saham-saham AS sudah “grossly over-valued” namun tersamarkan oleh persepsi mayoritas pelaku pasar karena – seperti tahun 2000 dan 2007 – ada sektor-sektor kecil yang membuat ‘aggregate’-nya seolah masih wajar.

Dari perhitungannya menunjukkan bahwa median valuation berada di level tertinggi dalam 23 tahun, bahkan 40% lebih tinggi dari’exurbance’ valuations Alan Greenspan yang terkenal tahun 1996 lalu.

Kini, perbedaan besar dengan tahun 2000 dan 2007 adalah pemerintah dan bank sentral sudah banyak mengeluarkan segala kemampuan mereka untuk memberikan keyakinan bawah semuanya akan baik kembali.

Dia pun menyimpulkan “there will be no place to hide when the tide turns.”

Berikut penjelasan Damien Cleusix lebih lengkap, yang tentu saja masuk dalam kategori WAJIB DIBACA:

It is really going to end badly…

What if we are indeed only now reaching the top of the secular bull market…? What if

It is no secret that we view the US stock markets as grossly over-valued. In recent meetings, as in the Spring of 2007, we have insisted that not only are markets more overvalued than what they seem, the overvaluation is also general. Ed Easterling wrote a provocative article not long ago on the subject. Those who have read his two books, “Unexpected Returns” and “Probable Outcome” know the quality of his research.

  • In 2000 while TMT companies were reaching absurd valuation, small caps and quality value stocks where cheap. Remember that Berkshire Hathaway made its low the same day as the Nasdaq made its top or the same month as Julian Robertson, one of the best value stock pickers of history, liquidated his fund.
  • In 2007, the overvaluation was general but here again you had a sector distorting the various valuation ratios – financial companies. In the bear market that ensued, nobody who was long, even the best conservative value stock pickers, made money if they were long-only. There was carnage.

Today our contention is that markets are more overvalued than in 2007.

There will be no place to hide when the tide turns. No place. The best value managers will lose a lot of money, factors which have historically worked well will suffer a lot too (small caps will be crushed and could lose more than 60% from current levels, high dividend paying and shareholder yield stocks too as they are expensive relative to an expensive markets, quality stocks will outperform but not by much and given the concentration of hedge fund investors in some of them, they will be liquidated without mercy when blood will run in the street).

Margin factors are also the highest against the markets they have been since we have data in the early 90′s (and we doubt they were more expensive on a relative basis before).

In the graph below you can see 3 different valuation ratios where we try to remove the margin and sector overvaluation effect.


Data is based on Point in Time S&P 500 constituents since 1990. The red line is the median Price-to-Sale (P/S) ratio. The light blue line is the average of each components PS (an equal weighted P/S if you want) where the overvaluation of 2000 still stands out because of the SUN Micro of the time. The dark blue line is the average of the second and third quartile PS (we used Bloomberg for the components and the P/S data).

Remember Alan Greenspan’s irrational exuberance? It was in December 1996 and at the time it was indicating that the market was extremely expensive compared to history. Well in December 1996 the 3 ratios were 40% below current levels.

Today, the big difference with 2000 and 2007 is that government and central banks have already spent a lot of firing power to “make believe” that everything is fine again.

The current environment is structurally deflationary and real trend growth is much lower than what the Fed and most analysts believe. For many, many years we have talked about this (demography, overindebtness, oversupply…).  It means that inflation rate will be lower and unemployment higher than what the Fed is predicting. It also means that this is structural and not cyclical. It also means that the Fed, as long as it does not realize this, is going to continue what it has been doing for a very very long-term.

We have long said that investors’ bias causes them to sometimes struggle to see the world as it is and instead prefer to see it as it should be. Investors are too naive. Current policies are not what they should be (productive investment, deleveraging to move away from this culture of speculation and easy money) and we need a trigger to make this change. Could it be a more hawkish Fed with new governors nominated next year and/or realizing that they have created a fantastic bubble in the equity and corporate bond markets (both linked as most of the borrowing is done to buy back shares or other companies and hence the productive capital base is not increased further lowering long-term growth potential ceteris paribus).

With regard to the short-term markets movement we can only repeat what we said recently:

Market short-term volatility (intra-day) has increased markedly in the past few weeks. Important tops (cyclical) are made when valuations are extended (check), important divergences are forming (check), market uniformity decreasing substantially (check), exuberant optimism (check and congrat to R. Shiller…), markets overbought (check but could be more extreme on the daily time frame) and, finally, increased short-term volatility (check). You can use some pattern (series of small range days) if you really want to be cute.

The only ingredient missing here is a sell signal from our cyclical models which have stayed stubbornly positive since 2009 with the exception of a short-lived sell signal during the 2011 route. By definition, those cyclical signals will miss the first part of the decline which makes a 10-12% drawdown at the beginning of a cyclical bear market a rule rather than the exception. The above checks are all warnings that cyclical signals could turn down during the next correction (or at least in the near-term).”

What Do the Charts Say?

Jika masih perlu bukti lain bahwa bursa sedang ‘overvalued’, maka Anda harus baca tulisan Tyler Durden dari berikut:

“Ignoring the ongoing onslaught of one-off items that plague earnings reports and make apples to apples comparisons practically impossible, the fact of the matter as the following chart from Goldman so decisively points out, despite the ever-present hope that it’s different this time, recurring margins (long-believed to be the great white hope that earnings multiples will grow into), have collapsed to their lowest in 3 years. Combine that with slumping sales, record high leverage (providing little room for moar financial engineering), record high margin debt (no room for error), and a growing sentiment shift to ‘knowing’ that it’s all artificial and BTFATH seems like a stretch to us. It would appear Goldman agrees as 4 out of the 5 valuation approaches they use signal stocks are expensive.

Adjusted for one-off ‘tricks’ recurring margins for the S&P 500 are at 3-year lows…


But, the fact is that all of the gains of the index this year have come from multiple expansion hope…


as investors have piled in with record amounts of margined leverage…


As top-line sales growth has slumped…


leaving stocks expensive on all but “The Fed Model” basis…


Which Greenspan cited this week: The stock market “has gone up a huge amount, but it’s not bubbly in any sense that I see…”


Even with Cyclically-Adjusted P/E signaling major overvaluation…


But with financial engineering likely to hit a wall (of credit growth slowing – thanks to the Fed) as leverage hits a record high…


Investors who are BTFATH must ask themselves just who is the greater fool they will sell to…


Kesimpulan (oleh J. Paul Getty)

For as long as I can remember, veteran businessmen and investors – I among them – have been warning about the dangers of irrational stock speculation and hammering away at the theme that stock certificates are deeds of ownership and not betting slips… The professional investor has no choice but to sit by quietly while the mob has its day, until the enthusiasm or panic of the speculators and non-professionals has been spent. He is not impatient, nor is he even in a very great hurry, for he is an investor, not a gambler or a speculator. The seeds of any bust are inherent in any boom that outstrips the pace of whatever solid factors gave it its impetus in the first place. There are no safeguards that can protect the emotional investor from himself.”

Seperti biasa agar Anda tetap ceria, berikut cerita yang disukai para marinir dan sebuah gambar jenaka:

A former Sergeant, having served his time with the Marine Corps, took a new job as a schoolteacher. Just before the school year started he injured his back.

He was required to wear a plaster cast around the upper part of his body. Fortunately, the cast fit under his shirt and wasn’t noticeable. On the first day of class, he found himself assigned to the toughest students in the school.

The smart aleck punks, having already heard the new teacher was a former Marine, were leery of him and decided to see how tough he really was before trying any pranks.

Walking confidently into the rowdy classroom, the new teacher opened the window wide and sat down at his desk. When a strong breeze made his necktie flap, he picked up a stapler and promptly stapled the tie to his chest.

Dead silence… He had no trouble with discipline that year.


Terima kasih sudah membaca dan semoga beruntung!

Dibuat 31 Oktober 2013


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